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DICKINSON v. COATES, ASSIGNEE, &C.
A check on a bank not drawn on a particular fund, nor for the whole sum standing
to the credit of the depositor, does not, before presentment and acceptance, operate
either in law or in equity as an assignment of so much of the deposit.
Where, after the drawing and delivery, but before the presentment and acceptance of a check, the drawer makes an"assignment for the benefit of creditors, and
the assignee collects the whole deposit account from the bank, the checkholder is not
entitled to receive the amount of his check out of the fund so collected, but such
fund is distributable pro rata among all the creditors.

from the Circuit Court of Jackson county.
The facts were as follows:
The Mastin Bank, a corporation organized under the laws of
Missouri for the purpose of transacting a general banking business
at Kansas City, on the 2d day of August 1878, drew and delivered
to plaintiff its check upon the Metropolitan National Bank at New
York, as follows, to wit:
APPEAL

$500.

State of Missouri.
No. 196,225.
The Mastin Bank, Kansas City, Mo.,
August 2d 1878.
Pay to we order of M. H. Dickinson five hundred dollars.
JOHN J. MASTIN, Cashier.
To Metropolitan National Bank, New York.
The evidence showed that the said Metropolitan National Bank
was the regular correspondent of the Mastin Bank and its depository in New York, and at the time the above check was drawn
the Mastin Bank had on deposit and to its credit in the said Metropolitan National Bank, subject to draft or check, between $50,000
and $60,000; that on the 3d of August, the day after the above
check was drawn, the Mastin Bank closed its doors, and made an
assignment, in due form of law, of all its assets of every description,
to defendant (Coates), for the benefit of its creditors generally, of
which said assignment the said Metropolitan National Bank was
duly notified on the day it was made ; that the said check, drawn
in favor of plaintiff, was not presented to the Metropolitan National
Bank till the 5th day of August 1878, when payment was refused
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and the check protested for nonpayment, of which due notice was
given ; that in the months of September and October 1878,
defendant, Coates, as assignee, collected of said Metrdpolitan
National Bank between $50,000 and $60,000.
Plaintiff claimed that these facts gave him a right to a judgment
and decree of the court, declaring that defendant, Coates, held the
money so collected of the Metropolitan National Bank to the use
of plaintiff, and that Coates should be ordered to pay over to plaintiff the sum of $500, the amount of said check and interest thereon.
This claim was resisted by defendant, Coates, on the ground that
the amount collected by him of said bank belonged to the trust
fund held by him under the assignment, and could only be paid pro
rata on claims against the trust fund allowed in the course of
administering the trust.
The Circuit Court made the order and decree as prayed for by
plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
NORTON, J. (after stating the facts as above.)-It will be perceived from the above statement that the controlling question
arising on this record is, did the check* in question, it being
neither drawn on any particular fund, nor for the whole sum
due the drawer from the drawee, nor confaining any words of
transfer, operate before its presentment and: acceptance by the
drawee as an assignment, either in law or equity, of so much of
the deposit standing to the credit of the drawer in the New York
bank as the check called for? An affirmative answer to this
question affirms, and a negative one reverses, the judgment. Inasmuch as the. principle involved is one of importance, and upon
which there is some conflict of opinion, counsel, in view of the
decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in .the case of He Grade
v. German Savings Bank Association, 4 Mo. App. 830, has
earnestly insisted that the authorities bearing upon the subject be
reviewed by us with a view to the settlement of the question in
this state. The conflict of authorities cannot be reconciled and we
shall not attempt it, but will only consider them for the purpose
of ascertaining on which side of the question the weight of authority as well as reason lies. The question presented has been
answered in the negative by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the following cases: qhompson v. Riggs, 5 Wall. 663;
Banks v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 843; Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall.
69 ; Bank of Republic v. Millard, 10 Id. 152. In the last case
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cited, Justice DAvis, who delivered the opinion of the court,
observed: "It is'no longer an open question in this court since
the decision in the cases of the Marine Bank v. The Fulton Bank,
2 Wall. 252, and of Thompson v. Riggs, supra, that the relation
of banker and customer in their pecuniary dealings is that of
debtor and creditor. It is an important part of the business
of banking to receive deposits, but when they are received, unless
there are stipulations to the contrary, they belong to the bank,
become part of its general funds, and can be loaned by it as other
money. The banker is accountable for the deposits which he
receives as a debtor, and he agrees to discharge these debts by
honoring the checks which the depositors shall from time to time
draw on him. The contract between the parties is purely a legal
one, and has nothing in the nature of a trust in it." * * * "The
holder takes the check on the credit of the drawer in the belief
that he has funds to meet it, but in no sense can the bank be said
to be connected with the transaction. If it were true that there
was a privity of contract between the banker and holder when
the check was given, the bank would be obliged to pay the check,
although the drawer, before it was presented, had countermanded
its payment, and although other checks drawn after it was issued,
but before payment of it was demanded, had exhausted the funds
of the depositors. If such a result would follow the giving of
checks, it would be easy to see that bankers would be compelled to
abandon altogether the business of keeping deposits for customers."
• * * "The right of a depositor, as was said by an eminent
judge, is a chose in action, and his check does not transfer the
debt or give a lien upon it to a third person without the assent of
the depository. This is a well-established principle of law, and is
sustained by the English and American authorities."
In the case of Christmas v. Russell, supra, Justice SwAYNE,
speaking for the court, said, that "a bill of exchange or check is
not an equitable assignment pro tanto of the funds of the drawer
in the hands of the drawee."
The English authorities are to the same effect, of which the case
of ffopkinson v. Forster,L. R., 19 Eq. 74 (decided in 1873), is
a type, where it was held that a check was not an equitable
assignment of the drawer's balance at his bankers.
The courts of New York also return a negative answer to the
question before us in the following cases: Lunt v. Bank of North
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America, 49 Barb. 221; Chapman v. White, 2 Selden 412;
.,Etna Bank v. Fourth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 82; Duncan v.
Berlin, 60 Id. 151; Attorney-General v. Life Ins. Co., 71 Id.
325. In the case of Lunt v. Bank of l7orth America, supra, it
is said: "Checks drawn in the ordinary general form, not describing
any particular fund, or not using any words of transfer of the
whole or any part of the account standing to the credit of the
drawer in the bank upon which they are drawn, but containing
only the usual request, directed to the bank, to pay to the order of
the payee named a certain sum of money, are of the same legal
effect as inland bills of exchange, and do not amount to an assignment of the funds of the drawer in the bank, and there is no
liability of the party upon whom such an instrument is drawn
until after it is accepted, and until payment or acceptance it is
always revocable by the drawer."
In the case of the ..Etna National Bank v. Fourth National
Bank, supra, it is said: "The relation of banker and depositor is
that of creditor and debtor. Deposits on general account belong to
the bank, and are part of its general fund. The bank becomes a
debtor *to the depositor to the amount thereof, and the debt can
only be discharged by payment to the depositor or pursuant to his
order. Until payment or acceptance by the bank of a depositor's
check, or assignment of the credit by the depositor and notice to
the bank, the deposit is subject to his order."
So in Pennsylvania, in the case of Loyd et at. v. MeCaffrey,
46 Pa. St. 410, it was said by Justice STRONG, speaking for the
court, that "it cannot be maintained that Taylor's check, without
more, amounted to an equitable appropriation of the funds in the
hands of the banker to whom it was addressed; To make an order
or draft an equitable assignment, it must designate the fund upon
which it is drawn."
So in Massachusetts, in case of Carr v. National Security
Bank, 107 Mass. 45, Justice GRAY, who delivered the opinion,
speaking of general deposits, observed that "money deposited
becomes the absolute property of the bankers, impressed with no
trust, and which they may dispose of at their pleasure, subject
only to their personal obligation to pay an equivalent sum
upon his demand or order. The right of the bankers to use the
money for their own benefit, is the very consideration for their
promise to the depositor.- They make no agreement with the
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holder of his checks. A check drawn by the depositor in common
form not designating any special fund out of which it is to be paid,
nor correspondinj to the whole amount due him from the bankers at
the time, is a mere contract between the drawer and the payee, on
which, if payable to bearer and not paid by the drawees, any holder
might doubtless sue the drawer, but, which passes no title, legal or
equitable, to the payee or holder in the moneys previously paid to
the bankers by the drawer."
So in the case of Bullard v. Randall, 1 Gray 605, it was held:
"That a check for a part of the drawer's funds in a bank constitutes no assignment of that part of such funds until presented for
payment and accepted by the bank, although verbally assented to
by the cashier when absent from' the bank."
So in case of Dana v. National Bank, 13 Allen 445.
In Maryland, in the case of Moses v. Franklin, 34 Md. 580, it
was held that a check does not operate as an assignment pro tanto
of the fund on which it is drawn, until it is accepted or certified to
be good by the bank holding the fund ; and the doctrine of the case
of Chapman v. White, 2 Selden 412, was approved, where it was
held that a check before acceptance neither operates as an assignment nor creates any lien on the funds of the drawer. See, also,
2 Add. on Cont. 493 ; Bylea on Bills 39 (note 1); 2 Par.
on Notes and Bills 61 (note J.); also case of Bush v. Foote,
decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1880, and reported
in 11 Rep. 94. We have been cited by counsel for plaintiff to a
number of authorities as establishing a contrary doctrine to that
assumed in those above referred to, and upon examination of them
we find but three states where the question has otherwise been
ruled upon by the courts of last resort.
In South Carolina, in the case of Pogartie v. Stillman, 12 Rich.
518, it was held by u divided court (the chief justice dissenting),
that when a check is drawn by a depositor on a bank having sufficient funds to meet it, the holder, on giving notice to the bank,
has the right to be paid, and if payment be refused may maintain
an action against the bank on the implied promise which the law
raises in his behalf.
In Illinois, in the case of Munn et al. v. Burch, 25 Ill. 35, it
was held that " the check of a depositor on his banker, delivered
to another for value, transfers to that other the title to so much of
the deposit as the check calls for." Upon an examination of this
VoL. XXXII.-24
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case it will be seen that not a single authority, either English or
American, is referred to as maintaining the doctrine announced;
but the conclusion reached is made to rest upon a judicial recognition of what is alleged in the opinion to be a universal custom
of bankers to allow depositors to withdraw their funds in parcels.
This case was followed in 28 Ill. 168, also without the citation of
a single authority, Justice GATRON remarking that "the decision
of Munn v. Burch, supra, was not made till after the most mature
investigation." The case of Munn v. Burch, supra, was also followed in the case of Bank v. Bank, 80 Illinois 212, and, as
the logical result of the doctrine enunciated, the court went so far
as to say that "after a check had passed into the hands of a bona
fide holder it is not in the power of tlie'drawer to countermand its
payment," a dodtrine not maintained by any authority that has
come under our observation.
In Iowa, in the case of Roberts v. Austin, Cbrbin & 0o., 26
Iowa 315, it was held by a divided court that the holder of a check
could maintain an action thereon against the drawer before acceptance, the drawer having funds in his hands, and that a general
assignment of the drawer for the benefit of his creditors, after
drawing the check but before the same is presented, will not
invest his assignee with the right to tle money represented by the
check, nor affect the rights of the payee therein. The cases in
Kentucky to which we have been referred, of Buckner & Co. v.
Sayre, 18 B. Mon. 745, and Lester & Co. v. Given, Jones & Co.,
8 Bush 857, do not maintain the position contended for. The
said case of Buckner 6 Co. v. Sayre, supra, only decides that the
drawing of a bill of eichange by a debtor and its acceptance by
the drawee, is an appropriation of that fund to the holder of the
bill, and that thereafter the drawer of the bill has no right to control it, either by receiving or assigning it, and that a general
assignment of assets after a bill of exchange has been drawn and
accepted, will not pass the fund appropriated, and the ruling in
the case of Lester & Co. v. Given, Jones &' Co., supra, is based
solely upon the case of Buckner v. Sayre, supra. So far from
the case in Buckner v. Sayre, supra, being in conflict with the
New York and like cases cited herein from other states, it is in
accord with them. The decided weight of authority answers the
question propounded in the beginning of this opinion in the negative. This answer is returned by the Supreme Court of the United
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States, the courts of last resort in Maryland, Massachusetts, New
York and Pennsylvania, while an affirmative response is given by
the divided courts of Iowa and South Carolina, and by the case of
Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 35, which as an authority has been sufficiently adverted to in what has been said, and so far as this court
has heretofore been called on to pass upon questions kindred to
the one in hand it has ruled in accordance -with the doctrine
announced by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the
courts of Maryland, Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania.
In the cases of State ex rel. Mississippi County v. Moore, 74 Mo.
413, and of the State ex rel. v. Powell, 67 Id. 395, it was held
that a general deposit created the relation of creditor and debtor;
and in the case of Burnett v. Urandall et al., 63 Mo. 410, it was
held that a portion of a debt was incapable of assignment either at
law or in equity, in the absence of a debtor's consent.
So in the case of Loomis v. Robinson, 76 Mo. 488, it was held
that an assignment of part of a judgment was void both at law and
in equity. If, as established by the above cases, the relation
between depositor and banker is that of creditor and debtor, and
that a creditor cannot, either at law or in equity, assign a part of
a debt due him, without the debtor's consent, it must follow logi-,
cally that the check held by plaintiff, being only for part of the
debt due the draw er and not having been accepted by the drawee,
did not transfer to plaintiff either a legal or equitable right against
the drawee to so much of the fund as the check called for, or
give him any lien thereon. In the case of St. John v. Rfomans,
8 Mo. 382, it was held, Judge SCOTT delivering the opinion, that
"it could not be maintained that the mere act of drawing a check
was an assignment of the amount for which it was drawn, to the
bearer." In our investigation of this question we have confined
our examination to the decisions of courts of last resort, and in the
light of the authorities we must answer the question presented by
this record in the negative, and hold that the fund sought to be
appropriated by plaintiff to the payment of his debt, and in the
hands of defendant as assignee, is only subject to a pro rata distribution among the creditors of the Mastin Bank, of whom plaintiff
is one, whose claims have been allowed in due course of administering the trust.
Judgment reversed and bill dismissed. All concur..
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Supreme Court of Missouri.
MERCHANTS' NAT..BANK OF ST. LOUIS v. COATES, AssxGxE.
On a bill of interpleader filed by a bank against various claimants of a deposit
account, held, following Dickinsonv. Coates, supra, that the assignee of the depositor
for the benefit of creditors was entitled to the fund as against holders of checks
drawn and delivered before the assignment, but not accepted by the bank.

APPEAL from the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NORTON, J.-The Merchants' National Bank of St. Louis was
the correspondent and depository of the Mastin Bank at Kansas
City, and, as such, had in its hands between $20,000 and $30,000.
The said sum to the credit of the Mastin Bank was claimed by
Kersey Coates, in virtue of an assignment made to him on the 3d
of August 1878, by the Mastin Bank, of all its effects and assets
for the benefit of creditors generally, and payment thereof was
demanded by him. 'The sum in the hands of the depository bank
was also claimed by various checkholders of checks drawn by the
Mastin Bank upon the Merchants' National Bank, eleven of
which were drawn to various parties on the 2d of August 1878;
ten on the 1st of" August 1878, three on the 30th of July 1878;
one on the 29th of July and two on the 31st of July 1878. None
of these checks were accepted.
The Merchants' National Bank filed its bill in equity, setting
forth substantially the above facts, bringing the funds in dispute
into court, and praying that the claimants thereof be required to
interplead, and that it might be discharged of all further liability.
Interpleader Coates, as assignee, claimed the entire fund by virtue
of said assignment, as against all other interpleaders who held
unaccepted checks drawn previous to the assignment, and who,
in virtue thereof, claimed the fund, and the several checkholders
claimed the fund as .against each other. The Circuit Court held
that Coates, as assignee, was not entitled to the fund, and made
a distribution of it to certain of the. checkholders, from which
judgment, defendant Coates, as well as two of the checkholders,
interpleaders, appealed to the St. Louis Court bf Appeals,
where judgment was affirmed pro forma, from which defendant,
Coates, and the Topeka National Bank and William Mulhall, have
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appealed to this court. Under the ruling made at the present
term of this court in the case of Dickinson v. Ooates, Assignee et
al., supra, the judgment in this case must be reversed. It was
held in that case that a check drawn by a depositor upon his depository for part of the debt did not, till it was accepted, transfer
or assign to the holder either a legal or equitable claim to so much
of the fund as the check called for, nor did it give him a lien
thereon. We must therefore hold, in the present case, that the
fund in dispute is properly payable to defendant, Coates, as assignee,
for pro rata distribution among the creditors of the Mastin Bank,
whose claims have been or may be allowed by the assignee in due
course of administering the trust.
The judgment of the St. Louis Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the cause remanded to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, with
directions that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed and
the cause remanded to the Circuit Court, to be proceeded with in
conformity with this opinion. All conpur.
The foregoing principal cases, Dickinson v. Coates, and Merdiants' Nat.
Bank of St. Louis v. Coates, lately decided in the Supreme Court of Missouri,
present again, in an interesting and satisfactory form, the question, whether the
checkholder receives, as an incident of
the check, a right of action against the
bank or banker on whom the check is
drawn.
The question has arisen in
very many of the courts of this country,
and it is a matter of regret that the
learned judge who delivered the opinions in the two principal cases, did not
deem it necessary to discuss the features
of the cases which were most open to
doubt and conjecture, as will be explained later on.
All the important cases bearing on
the question have been cited by the
court, and no further citations are
necessary here. The number 'of authorities supporting the position that the
check does not constitute an equitable
assignment pro tauto of the fund on
deposit, is certainly greater than the
number which maintain the affirmative.

But I shall attempt to show that the
latter class of cases is supported by
reason and commercial usage, while the
error of the former will be rationally
explained and accounted for.
A careful reading of the cases, including the late cases from the Supreme
Court of Missouri, will disclose the fact,
in almost every instance, that the courts
have failed to distinguish between the
legal effect of checks and unaccepted
drafts or bills of exchange. The difference between these two classes of instruments has an important bearing
upon the question at issue. A check is
an order on a bank or banker to pay to
the holder, out of the funds deposited by
the drawer, the sum mentioned in the
check. An ordinary bill of exchange or
draft is an order upon an ordinary
debtor, drawn by the creditor, to pay to
the party named the sum set down in
the order. In the case of a bank or
banker, the deposit is made with the
express or implied agreement that the
depositor may draw against the deposit
in any sum and in favor of any one.
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That is the object of the deposit. As
between the depositor and depositary,
this implied agreement or understanding
clearly forms a part of the contract of
deposit, and gives to the depositor the
right to divide up the indebtedness
which is created by the deposit into as
many debts as there are checks drawn,
and as against the drawer the hank or
banker is bound in law to honor them
as long as there are funds in possession
to cover them. In the case of an ordinary bill of exchange, the order being
drawn on an ordinary debtor,-he is
under no obligation to the drawer to
pay the same unless the draft calls for
the whole indebtedness, because the
drawer has not obtained his consent to
divide up the debt into smaller ones,
and the law protects him against any
such attempt. His prior consent must
be shown in order to place him under
obligation to accept such drafts. These
are such elementary principles that no
citation of authorities is required for
their authentication. Now the burden
of the learned judge's opinion in the
principal cases seems to be that, if it is
held that a check works an assignment
pro tanto, it will be the creation of new
creditors without the consent of the
debtor. That this would be true in the
case of an ordinary bill of exchange, is
manifest. But in the case of a check,
the debtor, i. e. the bank, has already
given his consent when he receives the
money on deposit.
Those who oppose the right of the
checkholder to sue-the bank, generally
refer to the case of Mandeville v. Welch,
5 Wheat. 286, as laying down rules
which are contrary to the claim. But
this is erroneous. The words of Judge
STon are calculated to form the very
foundation upon which the claim can be
sustained. The following extract from
his decision in the above-mentioned case
will explain: "It is said that a bill of
exchange is, in theory, an assignment to
the payee of a debt due from the drawee

to the drawer. This is undoubtedly true,
where the bill has been accepted,
whether it be drawn on general funds
or a specific fund, and whether the
bill be in its own nature negotiable or
not; for in such a case the acceptor, by
his assent, binds and appropriates the
funds for the use of the payee. And to
this effect are the authorities cited at the
bar. In cases also, where an order is
drawn for the whole of a particular
fund, it amounts to an equitable assignment of that fund, and after notice to
the drawee it binds the fund in his
hands. , But where the order is drawn,
either on a general or a particular fund,
for a part only, it does not amount to an
assignment of that part or give a lien as
against the drawee, unless be consents
to the appropriation by an acceptance;
or an obligation to accept may befairly
implied from the custom' of trade or the
course of business between the parties, as
a part of the contract." Judge STORY
evidently considered the consent of the
drawee to be the all-important element
in deterniining whether the payee was
an assignee pro tanto of the debt. The
law does not permit a creditor to create
new creditors for his debtor without his
- (the dehtor's) consent. If this objection
is removed by obtaining his consent,
expressly or by implication, there is novalid reason why the payee should not
be permitted to enforce the drawee's
obligation to pay,if a privity of contract
can be established between them. In
the case of a check this consent is always
present, as a necessary incident of the
contract of deposit.
. The decisions are not uniform
as to
the grounds upon which they base the
right of the holder to sue. Some rest
upon the principle that, where a promise is made for the benefit of a third
person, that third person may maintain
an action upon it. This principle is as
warmly contested as the question which
is raised in the principal cases, and is
apparently not in accord with the
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fundamental principles of the law of
contracts.
(See annotator's article,
Central Law Journal, vol. xi., p. 161.)
If the right of the holder to sue can
be sustained at all, it can be more
safely supported on the theory of an
equitable assignment.
Here is the
weakness, if any, of the courts which
find themselves in the minority. The
consent of the bank cuts no figure in
the case at all, for the bank has previously given its consent, i. e., simultaneously with and as a part of the contract of deposit.
The relation of depositary and depositor has been repeatedly decided to
be that of debtor apd creditor. The
funds, when deposited, become the property of the depositary, and the depositor has only a chose in action. See
Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 10
Wall. 152, and cases there cited. If
the check can be construed to be an
assignment of the drawer's interest in
the deposit to the amount of the check,
since that interest is a chwse in action
against the bank, coupled with the right
to 'divide it up into as many choses in
action as may suit him best, that interest would pro tanto be passed into
the hands of the checkholder, and invest
him with the right of action against the
bank to enforce payment, if there were
funds in its possession and under its
control, at the time of presentment and
demand. An endorsement on the check
by the payee, to pay to the order of an
another, works an assignment of the
payee's interes. in the check. If such
an endorsement assigns the endorser's
interest in the check, what reasons can
be urged why the check does not assign
the drawer's interest pro tanto in the
deposit to the payee ? The drawer's
interest is a chose in action as well as the
payee's. The difficulty which the judges
in the older cases experienced in arriving at such a conclusion, arose from
the general non-assignability of choses
in action at common law. In Johnson v.
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Coilings, I East 104, which was an
action brought by the endorsee of a bill
of exchange drawn on a promise of a
debtor to accept it, Judge KExyox
said : "If we were to suffer the plaintiff to recover on the general counts, we
must say that a chose in action is assignable, a doctrine to which I never will
subscribe." Judge GaosE, in the same
case, said that "to permit the plaintiff
to recover would virtually be making
all. coses in action assignable."
The
saihe idea seems to pervade all the
older reports. Now that the law permits such assignments to an almost unlimited extent, this objection to the
checkholder's right of action against the
bank is removed. 'When a depositor
draws a check on the bank it is evidently his intentifn to transfer to the
checkholder his interest in the deposit
to the amount of the check. The words
which are generally employed "pay to
the order of," "pay to the bearer," are
sufficient to manifest that intention.
Moreover it is unquestionably the general understanding of the business world
that such is the case ; and this general
understanding will give to these words
the significance which they may not
inherently possess, if thereby no fundamental principle of law is violated.
The most serious objection to the
assignment theory which has been raised
by the opposing decisions is, that to constitute an equitable assignment of
money, by means of an order, the order
must direct the payment out of a particular fund, and not generally out of
any to be received. In Loyd et al. v.
McCaff'rey, 46 Pa. St. 410, Justice
STRoNG said: "It cannot be maintained that Taylor's check, without
more, amounted to an equitable appropriation of the funds in the hands of the
banker to whom it was addressed. To
make an order or draft an equitable
assignment it must designate the fund
upon which it is drawn." See to the
same effect, hillips v. Stagg, 2 Edw.
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ch. 108; Harrison v. Williamson, Id.
430; Chapman v. White, 6 N. Y. 412.
In equity an assignment will be valid
whenever the thing assigned is capable
of identification. It matters not whether
it be in existence at the time of assignment, or it is only a future possibility or
expectancy. " To make an assignment
valid at law, the thing which is the subject of it must have actual or potential
existence at the time of the grant or
assignment. But courts of equity will
support assignments, not only of Closes
in action and of contingent interests and
expectancies, but also of things which
have no actual or potential existence
and rest in mere possibility; not indeed
as a present positive transfer, operative
in prasenti, for that can only be of a
thing in esse, but as a present contract
to take effect and attach as soon as the
thing comes in esse:" Story's Equity
Jurisprudence, sect. 1040. So whether
the funds drawn against be in the possession at the time that the check is
drawn, or are to be received subsequently, the fact that the check is drawn
against a particular bank or banker is a
sufficient particularization of the fund,
in order to work an equitable Assignment pro tanto.of the fund on deposit.
It is probable that, in the general assignment to the defendant, Coates, for
the benefit of the creditors, $he clause
which operated as an assignment of the
deposit only described it as being deposited at and with a particular bank,
giving its name ; and yet no one would
question the right of the defendant to
draw out the money, so far as the bank
is concerned. There is here no clearer
description of the thing assigned than in
the case of a check.
The opposing authorities only state
that the check effects an assignment
only when it is accepted by the bank.
See Bullard v. Randall, I Gray 605;
Chapman v. White, 6 N. Y. 412. The
effect of acceptance is to change the
primary liability from the drawer to

the drawee, and that liability, when
assumed by acceptance, is absolute and
not at all dependent upon the fact that
he has fands of the drawer wherewith to
pay it. If the check does not constitute
an assignment before, it will not do so
after acceptance. The assignment proceeds, if at all, from the act of the
drawer; it is his interest which is to be
assigned, and the only effect which
acceptance would have upon it, would
be to make it binding upon the drawee
in cases where his express or implied
consent to such assignment was not previously obtained. This could obviously
happen only with a bill of exchange.
If the check is in any sense an assignment, it is effectual without any further
consent on the part of the bank.
The liability of the bank is, of course,
restricted only to such cases where the
check has not been countermanded.
The agreement of the bank or banker
which forms a part of the contract of
deposit, and which is claimed .to pass
with the check to the checkholder, is to
pay the check, if there are suffident
funds in its possession and under its
control at the time of presentment and
demand. This being an essential part
of the contract of deposit, the bank cannot be compelled to pay ihere payment
of the check has been countermanded by
the drawer before presentment by the
holder; because countermanding is, so
far as the bank is-conoerned, equivalent
to another disposition of the money,
which, having taken place before presentment of the check, takes precedence.
And whether the checkholder still has
any interest in the fund depends upon
the question whether the check works an
assignment as against the drawer.
This is but the natural consequence of
If the check
the leading proposition.
works an assignment in respect to the
drawee, it mnst have the same effect
against the drawer and his privies.
The holder of the check, therefore, can
claim the right to appropriate the funds,
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even against other creditors and a general assignee for the benefit of creditors.
It being, however, an' equitable assignment, and the thing assigned being
identified simply as the indebtedness of
the drawee to the drawer, it can only
be enforced while the fund 'retains
the means of identification.
Should
the fund be innocently (i. e. as to the
drawee) paid over to the drawer or his
assigns, it loses its identity unless the
identical sum can be traced and discovered in the hands of the drawer or
his assignee, and the check is consequently deprived of its value as an
assignment. See Row v. Dawson, I
Ves. Sr. 331; Couwperthwaite v. ,Sheffield, 3 Comst. 243.
Whether the check is such a complete
assignment of the drawer's interest as
that, after presentment, where the check
has been previously countermanded, the
drawee pays the money to the drawer at
his peril, has never been determined by
any adjudication. It is settled that he
can refuse to honor the check ; but does
the countermand of the drawer relieve
him of all obligation to the checkholder,
or does it place him in the position of a
stakeholder, and compel him to retain
the fund for the benefit of whichever of
the two shows himself entitled thereto?
It would be hard to expect a bank in
eiery case of countermanded checks to
hord the funds, and become a party to
suits on the same. It is most likely

that this position would not be assumed
even by those courts which are inclined
to push tfie assignment theory to the
utmost limit.
Now, if the position assumed in this
annotation is upheld in all its details,
the decision of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, in the case of Dickinson v.
Coates could, nevertheless, be held to be
correct in its conclusion, viz. : that the
plaintiff had no right of action against
the defendant, not because the check does
not work an equitable assignment pro
tanto of the fund on deposit, but because
the means of identifying the fund bare
been lost by its ceasing to be a debt of
the drawee or bank with whom the fund
has been deposited. For it is to be presumed from the facts, as stated in the
opinion of the court, that the identical
fund cannot now be ascertained, i. e., it
cannot now be ascertained what particular money or moneys were received
by defendant from the bank of deposit.
But in the second case, the Merrhants'
Nat. Bank of St. Louis v. Coates et al.,
since the bank of deposit has retained
the custody of the fund, and is a party
to this suit by way of an interpleader,
under the construction that the cheek
works an equitable assignment of the
fund, judgment should have been given
for the checkholders.
CHRISTOPHiER G. TznDnxteA.
Columbia, Mo.
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The material alteration of a promissory note, made at the instance of the payee
and without the knowledge of the maker, releases the latter from all liability on
the note. The addition to an instrument of the name of a party, as maker, is a
material alteration of it.
The word "executed,I as used in an answer, charging that the note sued upon
was materially changed after it had been "executed and delivered," implies a complete and perfect contract.
VOL. XXXII.-25
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from the Clark Circuit Court.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion, which was
delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-To the complaint of appellant, charging that the
appellees, William C. Coombs, Richard F. Nugent and David S.
Koons, executed to him the promissory note sued on, the appellees, Coombs and Nugent, answered separately. The answer of
the former is, omitting formal parts, as follows: " That after he
and his co-defendant, Richard F. Nugent, had executed and delivered the note sued on herein, and without the knowledge or
consent of this defendant, the plaintiff procured David S. Koons
to subscribe the said note as one of the makers thereof."
It is urged that the answer is bad for the reason that it does not
aver that the name of Koons was added after the note was completed. This position is.not tenable. The word executed implies
both a signing and delivery,.,and a signed note duly delivered is a
complete contract. In a"legal sense the word execute includes
APPEAL

delivery and implies a complete contract:

Graham v. Graham,

55 Ind. 23, vide 28; Pratherv. Zulauf, 38 Id. 155.
It is settled law in this state that the material alteration of a
promissory note made at the instance of the payee, and. without the
knowledge of the maker, releases the latter from all liability on the
note: Hert v. Oehler, 80 Ind. 83; Bowman v. Mitchell, 79 Id.
84; Monroe v. Paddock, 75 Id. 422. It is also firmly settled
that the addition of the name of a party as maker is a material
alteration of the instrument: Harperv. The State ex rel., 7 .Blackf.
61; Herry v. Coats, 17 Ind, 161; Bowers v. Briggs, 20 Id. 139;
Bigelow on Bills and'Notes 579. The answer was unquestionably
good. The answer of Nugent is the same as that of Coombs, with
the exception of a change in names, and the questions arising upon
it are, therefore, disposed of by what has been said in considering
the latter's answer. There was testimony showing that the note
sued on was signed by the appellees; that it was accepted by the
appellant, and, that after this had taken place, the latter, without
the knowledge of the former, procured Koons to sign as a maker;
it cannot, therefore, be said that the finding of the trial court is
not sustained by the evidence. After the signing and delivery of
the note, the appellees could not recall it nor the appellants change
it. From that time it became a complete and perfect contract.
The silence of the makers vested no authority in the payee to
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procure an additional signature to the note. The delivery of the
note closed the contract, and it was the duty of the appellant to
have kept it unchanged.
Judgment affirmed.
Any material alteration of a bill of was added to it without the consent of
exchange or promissory note without the original maker. Clerk v. Blackthe consent of the drawer or endorser stock, 1 Holt N. P. 474, decided
of the one, or maker of or surety upon nothing more than this, as a careful
the other, vitiates it. No suit can be analysis reveals.
maintained upon it as it is after its
In Oatton v. Simpson, 8 Ad. & El.
alteration, for as such it was never exe- 136, it was held that an additional party
cuted ; nor upon it in its original form,
signing without a stamp was not bound
because as originally executed it is no by his signature, and that the alteration,
longer in existence. Upon this all the therefore, was not material. In that
writers and authorities upon this sub- case the original note was signed by a
ject agree ; the only difference in them principal and surety, jointly and sevis as to what constitutes a material erally, and the new name was procured
alteration: Ames N. & B. 434-447, by the principal for an extension of time.
and note I ; Story on Promissory Notes The original surety paid the note, and
545 (6th ed.) ; Bridges v. Winters, 42 sued his principal for the money paid to
his use. The principal defended on the
Miss. 135 ; s. o. 2 Am. Rep. 598;
Falmouth v. Roberts, 9 m. & W. 469;
ground that the payment was voluntary,
for all agree that an immaterial altera- because the surety had been discharged
tion (2 Parsons N. & B. 544 ; Bachellor by the alteration, and had no right to
v. Priest, 12 Pick. 399 ; Hubbard v. pay the note; but his defence was
Williamson, 5 Ired. 397), or one that rejected.
In Gardner v. Walsh, 5 El. & B. 83,
does not change the legal effect of the
bill or note is not such an alteration as a principal and surety made a joint and
will render it void: Granite Railway several promissory note, and a second
Co. v. Bacon, 15 Pick. 239 ; Johnson v. surety was added after delivery, without
Heagan, 23 Me. 329 ; Smith v. Smith, the knowledge or consent of the first.
1 R. I. 398 ; Reed v. Roark, 14 Texas It was held that the first surety was
329 ; Pars. N. & B. 568.
discharged by the alteration ; and the
In an early English case it was held, opinion was expressed by the court that
that where a joint and several promisCatton v. Simpson, supra, was not law.
sory note was made by several parties In Aldous v. Cornwell, L. R., 3 Q. B.
concerned in a jmnt undertaking, for the 573, Catton v. Simpson, supra, is cited
purpose of securing repayment of a as an authority on the point that an
loan, and one of the parties signed it alteration will not vitiate a note unless
several days after the party did who material, and the case of Gardner v.
borrowed the money, the note did not
Walsh, supra, was referred to, merely to
require an additional stamp if it was -say, that it only overruled the former
signed before the money was paid, but case on the question whether such an
if it was signed after the money was alteration as that passed upon was mapaid, an additional stamp was neces- terial. The court was somewhat severe
sary: Ex parte White, 2 Deac. & Chit. in condemning the earlier cases that
334. The note was here treated as a paid no attention to the materiality of
valid note, although an additional name the alterations.
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It has been also held in England, that
if a third party, after its execution,
signs a note upon the face of it, with the
intention of becoming an indorser, and
for that purpose only, it does not render
the note void: Ex parte Yates, 2 De G.
& J. (Ch.) 191. So, to a declaration
upon a note accepted, payable to the
order of L., and by him endorsed to
the defendant, and by' the defendant
to the plaintiff, a plea that the hill was,
after the endorsement by the defendant,
materially altered, without his consent,
by the insertion of his name as an endorsee prior to the defendant's endorsement, was held bad, as the alteration
did not vary the nature of the instrument, but was a mere correction of a
mistake which gave the instrument the
effect which it was intended to have:
London 4- Provincial Bank v. Roberts,
22 W. R. 402.
In three cases decided at an early day
in Kentucky, it was held, that the name
of an additional surety placed upon a note
without the prior surety or maker's consent vitiated the note: Bank of Limestone v. Penick, 2 T. B. Mon. 98 ; a. c.
15 Am. Dec. 136; Bank of Limestone
v. Penick, 5 T. B. Mon. 25 ; Sipp v.
Suggett, 9 B. Mon. 5. The principle
said to be involved in these cases was
the same as in the case of the alteration
of a deed ; in one, after the alteration,
it was not the deed of the grantor; in
the other, not the note of the maker.
The same point was decided in other
Kentucky cases; and it was said if the
maker assented to the changed condition
of the note at any time after it was so
changed, it was a binding obligation upon
him; and a jury was authorized to find
such assent upon very slight evidence:
Payne v. Withers, 8 Dana 98; Lilley v.
Evans, 3 B. Mon. 417.
.Some cases have sought to draw a
distinction as to the time at which the
additional name is affixed to the note.
Thus where a note had been signed by
the defendant as a joint principal and

intrusted to his- associate, it was held
that he gave his principal implied authority to obtain either additional sureties, or joint makers, indefinitely, until
the note was fairly launched in the
market as a security. It was said that
the rule was the same if the defendant
had signed only as a surety : Keith v.
Goodwin, 31 Vt. 268; Hall's Adm'x
v.'fdclenry, 19 Iowa 521. In the case
last cited it was held, that if the holder
took the note with notice of the adding
of the additional name, the note was
void. The same doctrine has been declared in other Iowa cases: Dickerman
v. Miner, 43 Iowa 508 : Hamilton v.
IHooper, 46 Id. 515. "
So in Wisconsin it was said, that a
note signed in blank by one person, as
maker, for the accommodation of another to whom it is delivered, and afterwards signed by a third person as joint
maker, would -probably be void in the
hands of one who takes it with knowledge that, at the time of executing it,
the first signer expressly stipulated
against a further signature ; but where
the note, when signed by the first maker,
contained, among other blanks, one for
words making it a joint or several obligation, and was delivered to the person
for whose accommodation it was made,
without any express stipulation against
further signatures, it was held to have
authorized such person to procure it to
be signed bi other parties or joint
makers with the first. It will be observed that this case turned upon a
question of agency, as the court stated,
and not upon the alteration of the note.
Proof of the fact that there was a
blank left in the note, was held a sufficient establishment of the agency to fill
them up: Snyder v. Van Doren, 46 Wis.
602. The Iowa cases decide, in fact,
nothing more than this Wisconsin case.
It was only a question as to whether
the defendant had authorized the procuring of additional signatures by his
action.
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In Ohio it was held that the signing of
a note by a stranger after its delivery
vitiated it ; it was'said,, however, that if
he signed it as a surety it would not have
avoided it. It is difficult to see the
ground for such a distinction : Wallace
v. Jewell, 21 Ohio St. 163.
One of the Iowa authorities cited,
held that where a note had been fully
issued and delivered to the payee, the
addition of another maker, at the instance of the payee, and without the
knowledge of the other maker, operated
as a discharge of the latter: Ball's
Adm'x v. Mc Henry, 19 Iowa 521. It was
so held in Indiana: Bowers v. Briggs,
20 Ind. 139. So where C., member of
the firm of C. & Co., obtained an accommodation endorsement to his individual note, and then added "& Co."
to his signature, thus making it his
'firm's note, it was held a material alteration, and to vitiate the note: Haskell
v. Champion, 30 Missouri 136. In an
Indiana case the court decided that an
additional surety discharged the maker,
and said: "It is idle to say that the
defendant was not injured by the addition of another name as maker of the
note. The character and identity of the
instrument endorsed by the defendant
was changed by the alteration.
The
alteration left in existence no instrument
endorsed by the defendant; that instrument was destroyed : Henry, v. Coates,
17 Ind. 161 ; First Nat. Bank of
Springfieldv. Fricke, 13 Rep. 727. The
Kentucky cases, as observed, were decided upon the same principle here
announced.
The Supreme Court of Michigan refused to follow the authority of the
Indiana and Kentucky cases. It was
there held that the principal in a note
is not injured in any way by having the
name of a surety added without his consent, and such additian does not invalidate the note. The court said: "It is
very difficult to see how such a change
can affect him in any way, it is a mere

technicality, which neither changes,
increases or diminishes his liability.
Where there is no surety, the principal
is liable to be sued severally, and made
to pay the whole debt, if he has any property liable to execution. His liability
on a joint judgment is precisely the
same. His property is primarily liable,
and if he has enough to pay the judgment, and it is paid by him, or out of
his property, he has no further concern
with the surety, or he can have no right
of contribution for his own debt. The
fact that he may not pay, does not in
any way affect the nature or extent of
his judgment obligation. A surety may,
perhaps, in some cases, be injuriously
affected by an addition to the number of
sureties, where there is more than one
already; as, in the case of the bankruptey of any of them, his obligation to
pay may be increased, and his right of
contribution against co-sureties diminished by the change. But, as the principal is bound to pay the whole debt
without contribution, his liability cannot
possibly be changed by the addition of
sureties:" Miller v. -Finley, 26 Mich.
249. So a like decision was rendered
in .Alabama, though it was admitted
that the identity of the note was destroyed; Montgomery R-ailroad Co. v.
Hurst, 9 Ala. 513. In California,
where a draft was delivered to S. for
the plaintiff, and S. altered it, it was
held, in the absence of proof, that the
plaintiff authorized the alteration, and
it did not vitiate the draft: Langenberger v. Kroeger, 48 Cal. 147. See
Vance v. Collins, 6 Cal. 435.
So in New York, where the payee of
a note, without the knowledge or consent of the maker, procured a third
person to sign her name to the note as a
co-principal; and before its maturity it
came into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration,
without notice, it was held that the purchaser was entitled to recover against
both of the defendants, and that the
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addition of the name was not a material
alteration of the note, and did not
render it void as to the original maker :
Card v. Aliller i 1 Hun .504. The only
distinction. between this and the Michigan case is, that the holder was an
innocent endorsee for value in the former, without notice of the alteration,
while in the latter he was regarded as a
holder with notice. In another New
York case it was held, if the holder of a
note, without an endorser's knowledge
or consent, procure a second name to a
sale note, for the purpose of adding to
their security, such alteration is an
immaterial one and does not affect
the endorser's liability: MdCaughey v.
Smith, 27 N. Y. 39. This case goes
as far as the Michigan case, and is
followed by another announcing the
same doctrine: Brownell v. . Winnie,
29 N. Y. 400. But the last case cited
is clearly distinguishable from the case
in Ilun's Reports, upon the ground that
in the latter the person making the
alteration alone defended, while in the
former the original maker defended.
There is no doubt that the poeon
making the alteration is estopped to
deny his liability upon the note: Cobb
v. Titus, 10 N.- Y. 198. In another
New York case it was held, that an
additional signer was jointly and severally liable with the maker to a holder of
the note, and judgment' was allowed
against both as joint makers. This
was a ease where the payee sold the
note, and to secure the sale signed it at
the request of the purchaser: Partridge
v. Colby, 19 Barb. 248.
Two other New York cases are to be
noticed. They are Chappell v. Spencer,
23 Barb. 584, and Mcrean v. Scott, 46
Id. 379. These have been frequently
cited as authorities, but were expressly
overruled in Card v. Miller, I Hun 504.
In the former it was held that the writing of the payee's name, by himself, as
surety, under the maker's name, was a
material alteration. The latter case

was similar to

Partridge v.

Colby,

supra.

Of course, consent to the adding of a
name may be given, as elsewhere stated;
and the administrator may consent to
such change in his intestate's note, so as
not to release the estate: Voiles v.
Green, 43 Ind. 374. And if a purchaser of a note, before purchasing it,
exhibits it to the maker, and is assured by
him that he has no defence to it, the latz
ter cannot afterwards assign as a defence,
that previous to the purchase the note
had been altered by the dddition of a
new name: Vaughn v. Ferrall, 57 Ind.
182.' So if the alteration is made and
the note afterwards restored to its
original condition, with the approval of
the maker, this will amount to a ratification, and the maker will be held
liable; Collins v. Makepeac 13 Ind..
448. So in a similar case it was held
not necessary to the validity of a note
that it should be ratified, as where the
additional name had been erased; "because such erasure was no alteration of
any contract that Loring ever made, for
it neither altered the note as it was
when Loring endorsed it, nor as it was
when it first became available as a
security :" Whitmore v. Nickerson, 125
Mass. 496. *
In Monson v. Drakeley, 40 Conn.
552, after delivery, a party signed a
joint and several note of the maker and
two sureties as surety; no question
of alteration being raised, the court
held that he would not, unless in pursuance of an arrangement at the time
of the execution or delivery, become a
joint promisor or maker, and that the
subsequent undertaking was independent
of, and collateral to, the original ; but
the suretf so signing was bound for
contribution to the original sureties.
In a like case it was held, that such
subsequent undertaking upon a new
consideration, was a new and independent contract, not requiring the
consent of the original promisor: Stone
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v. White, 8 Gray 589. The Iowa cases construed it as an immaterial alteration.
adopted this doctrine ; Dickerman v. And where a note had been signed by
Miner, 43 Iowa 508; Hamilton v. the maker and one surety, and delivHooper, 46 Id. 515. But there must be ered, and afterwards a second surety
a consideration for such signing, and signed it without the consent of the
unless there is the additional surety or maker or first surety, it was held that
maker will not be bound : Briggs v. the second surety could not plead the
Downing, 48 Iowa 550; Tenney v. alteration of the note. "We know of
Prince, 7 Pick. 243; s. c. 4 Id. 385; no authority whatever in support of the
Clark v. Small, 6 Yerg. 418 ; Green v. proposition that the appellant's (the second surety) alteration of the original
Shepherd, 5 Allen 589.
A promissory note payable to and at a note by his own execution thereof,
certain bank, was signed by A. and B., would, of itself, avoid such note as
the former being the maker, the latter against the appellant :" Crandall v.
his surety, and delivered by A., for a .irst National Bank of Auburn, 61 Ind.
valuable consideration, to C., who, for 349. The court added, in substance:
the purpose of having it discounted for It may be true if the facts pleaded as a
his benefit at the bank-it having been defence had been pleaded by the first
prepared by A. and B. with that ex- surety, they " would 'have constituted a
pectation--signed the note as maker, good and sufficient defence in his bewithout the knowledge or consent of B., half." In Michigan, where one of two
joint makers obtained of the payee an
upon the requirement of the officer of
the bank, but with the express agree- extension of time, and procured an adment with such officer that he did so as ditional surety, it was held not to dissurety or guarantor to the bank for both charge the other maker, though as
the other makers, and not as joint between the makers the latter claimed to
surety with B. After maturity the bank be surety only, the payee having no
sued A., B. and C., upon the note; C. notice of such relation : Gano v. Heath,
was "not found;" and judgment was 36 Mich. 441. Under the Indiana cases
rendered against A. and B. by default, it is evident that the co-maker would
upon their failure -to appear. C. paid have been held to have been disclarged,
the bank the amount of the judgment upon the ground that the evidence of the
under promise by the bank to assign it indebtedness was changed. The case just
to him. It was held that the signing by cited is in consonance with the other
C. was not such an alteration of the note Michigan case: Miller v. Finley, supra.
as rendered it void as to B. ; that C. was If a special indorser's name is incora co-surety with B. ; and that C. was rectly spelt, and when he endorses it
entitled to an execution for his benefit over, lie writes it correctly, this doez
on the judgment against A. and B. ; not amount to material alteration:
and A., having become insolvent, such Leonardv. Wilson, 2 Cromp. & M. 589 ;
execution was properly levied for the 4 Tyrw. 415. Adding the name in full,
whole amount thereof upon the pro- of a firm, to a bill drawn by them in the
perty of B. : Bowser v. Rendell, 31 firm's name, is not a material alteration,
Ind. 128. The court relied upon the being in effect only the adding the
fact that A. and B. failed to make a Christian name of the drawer, whose
surname had been affixed to the bill
defence on account of the alteration of
the note, when the judgment was before acceptance; and so much the law
rendered; and could not raise that supplies: Blair v. Bank of Tennessee,
question on a suit to enjoin the col- 11 Humph. 84.
So where a firm did business under
lection of the judgment, although they
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the style of A., B. & C., and also as
the Providence Steam Pipe Co., a note
was payable to the firm by the latter
style of-name, which was endorsed by a
surety, and afterwards altered by the
makcr and payee, without the knowledge
of the surety, so as to be payable to the
same firm under the style of A., B. &
C., the alteration was held to be immaterial, and not to discharge the surety:
Arnold v. Jones, 2 R. I. 345.
A case somewhat similar to Bowen v.
Rendell, supra, was decided at an early
day in New York. There the holders
of a note, in order to get it discounted
signed their own names as makers ; in
addition to the rest-the note being joint
and several-and afterwards paid it; it
was held that they thereby lost no rights,
and were authorized to sue it on themselves, or transfer it to others: Muir v.
Demaree, 12 Wend. 468.
If the signing of a note be attested
by witnesses, and the Statute of Litritations has a longer time to run than
on a note unattested, then the attestation of such a note not before
attested, by a person who was not present at the signing, is a material alteration of the contract, and destroys its
validity: Brackett v. Mountfort, 11 Me.
114; Smith v. Dunham, 8 Pick. 246;
Homer v. Wallis, 11 Mass. 309. But
where only one witness was necessary,
and a second witness afterwards put on
his name, it was held not to alter the
effect of the note, and so did not render
it void : Ford v. Ford, 17 Pick. 418.
If the attestation is added at any time
before the note was negotiated, it will
be presumed to have received the consent
of the maker: Eddy v. Bond, 19 Me.
461. If two witnesses are necessary to
change the effect of an unattested note,
and a note after its delivery, and without the consent of the maker, is attested
by two witnesses, the ratification of the
subscription by one only of the two
witnesses does not cure the attestation :
Henning v. Wurkheiser, 8 Pa. St. 518.

The following cases further illustrate
the irregular attestation of notes :
Thornton v. Appleton, '29 Me. 298;
Marshall v. Gougler, 10 S. & R. 164;
Rollins v. Bartlett, 20 Me. 319; Rape
v. Westcott, 3 Harr. 244; Adams v.
Frye, 3 Met. 103; Willard v. Clarke, 7
Id. 435 ; Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Ia.
St. 119.
This review of the cases shows that
they are not by any means harmonious
as to the result of adding an additional
name to a note without the consent of
the parties liable to pay it. Some cases
regard such addition a material alteration, ahd, therefore, hold that it avoids
the note, upon the same reasoning that
an additional name to a deed, or instrument under seal, avoids such deed or
sealed instrument. Other cases hold
that, while it is a material alteration, it
is not sufficient to release the original
sureties or makers, while other cases
regard it as an immaterial alteration,
and, consequently, no release of maker
or surety. The last two classes hold that
such alteration in no way increases the
liability of the maker or surety; the
maker cannot object to the additional
name, because he must ultimately pay
the note under any circumstances ; and
the surety cannot object, because some
one is willing to share the risk with
him.

Not one of the cases present a state
of facts where, besides the maker, there
are two or more sureties upon the note at
the time of signing by the additional
maker or surety. In Miller v. Finley,
supra, there is a statement that the
adding of an additional surety would
probably release the prior sureties, as in
the case of contribution, such addition
would have the effect to increase the
liability of the sureties instead of decreasing it, if one or more sureties were
to become insolvent. It is evident that
following out the reasoning of this case
to its legitinate end, the addition of
a maker's name could not be urged
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as a release of the sureties, where there
were two or more, because no question
of contribution could jossibly arise. If
we regard the additional name as one
of:the .makers of the note where there
were two or more prior makers, and
that they have a right to compel each
oth.r to contribute, it is clear, in case
of the bankruptcy or insolvency of any
one of the makers, that the liability of
the remaining parties is increased by
such additional name. But the addition of such additional maker, in such a
case would not increase the liability of
the two or more' sureties ; it would, in
fact, be for their benefit, and, under the
reasoning of those cases which hold that
there is no release unless an actual
injury is sustained, it would not work
their release.
As to the other point raised in the
principal case. In Prather v. Zulauf,
38 Ind. 155, it is said that the "delivery of a note is the final act of executioit." - See Ketcham v. New Albany,
etc., Railroad Co., 7 Ind. 391. In the
case of Bagley v. McNiclde, 9 Cal. 430,
it was said that "the term ' has execnted unto,' when applied to instru-

ments of writing, impart both making
and delivery." See Faunce v. State
Mutual Life Assurance Co., 101 Mass.279; Walbrid'ge v. Arnold, 21 Conn.
425 ; Aktate v. Young, 23 Minn. 551.
So in Michigan, where a rule of court
did not require proof of the execution
of the instrument to be made unless
denied under oath, it was said: "Execution can only refer to the actual
making and delivery, but it cannot
-involve other matters without enlarging
its meaning beyond reason :" Freeman
v. Ellison, 37 Mich. 459.
Where an answer alleged that the
defendant had "executed" the note
sued on, but had never " delivered" it,
it was held that the word "executed"
was, as used, synonymous with the
word "signed ;" and that the answer,
fairly construed, meant that the notes
were signed but not delivered : Ricketts
v. Harvey, 78 Ind. 152.
With reference to a deed, the word
"execution" "mean s that it has been
delivered, as well as signed and sealed :"
Gaskill v. King, 12 Ired. 221.
W. W. TuoRNTON.

Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
FIRST NAT. BANK OF NEVADA t. BRYAN ET AL.
A mortgage executed by a married woman under duress of imprisonment upon
the person of her husband, is, as between her and the mortgagee, void.
The bona fide holder of a negotiable mortgage note, taken for value before
maturity, may recover upon it, although both note and mortgage were obtained by
duress; but he is not entitled to a foreclosure of the mortgage where the property
is the wife's homestead mortgaged to secure the husband's note.
Mortgages are not intended to circulate as commercial paper, and the interests
of commerce do not require that the. principles applicable to negotiable paper be
extended to mortgages executed as was the one in question.
Where the answer does not formally allege duress, but sets up facts sufficient to
constitute it, the defence will be received, evidence of duress being admitted without objection.

from the District Court of Story county.
The plaintiff, as the endorsee before maturity of a negotiable
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promissory note for $645, executed by Solon Bryan to the order
of P. F. Nelson, brings this -action to recover the amount of said
note, and to foreclose a mortgage to secure the same, executed by
Mary E. Bryan and Solon Bryan upon their homestead. The
court found that both the note and mortgage were obtained by
duress, and that the plaintiff, as an innocent holder of the note for
value before maturity, was entitled to recover upon the note, but
was not entitled to a foreclosure of the mortgage.
-Dyer & Fitzpatrick,for appellant.
. H. Balliett and S.

. Balliett, for appellee.

DAY, C. J.-The appellant insists that the answer does not
set up that the note and mortgage were obtained by 4uress. The
appellee filed an amended abstract, setting forth that the defendant
under leave of court filed an amended answer to meet the evidence,
formally setting up that the note and mortgage were made under
duress. The appellant denies that such amendment was filed. We
have examined the transcript and do not find any reference to such
amendment. However, we regard this question as immaterial.
The original answer sets up facts sufficient to present the defence
of duress, in view of the fact that the evidence was admitted without objection.
It appears from the evidence that Solon Bryan had a contract
for erecting a school-house in Harlan; that he purchased the bricks
therefor from P. F. Nelson, and that to secure $945 of the purchase price he executed a chattel mortgage upon 150,000 of the
bricks ; that he failed in the execution of his contract, and turned
over his contract, together with the bricks mortgaged to Nelson, to
his sureties on his bond for the performance of his contract, and
that they assumed and completed the erection of the building. It
further appears that the sureties had knowledge of the existence
of the mortgage when they took the assignment of the contract.
The attorney of Nelson locked Solon Bryan in his office, and
demanded a mortgage to secure the balance due on the bricks,
which was then $645, and represented that, unless he executed the
mortgage, he was liable to prosecution, and would probably be
prosecuted for selling and disposing of mortgaged property. The
attorney also procured a letter to Mary E. Bryan from her husband
for a description of the homestead property. She at first refused
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to furnish a description without seeing her husband. The attorney
of- Nelson told .her that she could not see her husband; that he
was locked up in his office, and could not come out; that Bryan
had sold mortgaged property, and that they had a warrant for his
arrest; and that if she would give a description of the homestead
for a mortgage, it would save his arrest; that it was a penitentiarjr
offence to sell mortgaged property; and that if she did not give the
description they would send him to the penitentiary. Mary E.
Bryan went to the office of the attorney and was admitted, and her
husband then told her that they had got him into some trouble, and
that by giving a mortgage upon the homestead for a short time, it
would help him out. It seems that the note and mortgage were
executed at that time and place. Mary E. Bryan testifies that she
was induced to sign the mortgage by what the attorney had said,
that it would save Mr. Bryan's arrest, and that they would
straighten it up before the mortgage was due. We are satisfied
that the execution of the mortgage was not the voluntary act
of Mary E. Bryan, and that it was obtained by duress, under the
doctrine of Green v. Scranage, 19 Iowa 461.
The most important question in the case is as to whether the
plaintiff, an innocent holder of the note before maturity; is entitled
to a foreclosure ofithe mortgage. It has been held by this court
that a bona fide endorsee before maturity of a nite secured by a
mortgage, without notice of infirmities, takes the mortgage as he
takes the note, free from the defences to which it is sulbject in the
hands of the mortgagee: Prestonv. Case, 42 Iowa 549 ; Farmers'
Nat. Bank of Salem v. Fletcher, 44 Id. 252; (Jlasey v. Sigg, 51
Id. 371. In all of these cases the mortgages were voluntarily
executed upon the property of the persons who executed the notes.
Beyond the doctrine of these cases we do not feel justified in going
in the application to mortgages of the principles which pertain to
negotiable paper. In Burbank v. Warwick, 52 Iowa 493, where
no note was delivered with the mortgage to the mortgagee, it was
held that an assignee of the mortgagee took it subject to all equities
between the original parties. In Tabor v. Foy, 56 Iowa 539,
where the note accompanying the mortgage was forged, it was held
that the assignees of the mortgagee took it subject to all defences
existing against it in the hands of -the mortgagee, notwithstanding
the admission of the mortgagor that she signed the mortgage.
This case differs from all those which have heretofore been
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determined in this court.

In this case the mortgaged property

belongs to Mary E. Bryan, who did not sign the note, and.the
mortgaged property is her homestead. Her execution of the
mortgage was procured by duress, and was not her free and
voluntary act. Section 1990 of the Code requires the concurrence
of both the husband and wife to a conveyande or incumbrance
of the homestead. Mary E. Bryan did not legally concur in this
conveyance. As between her and the mortgagee the mortgage was
void. Mortgages are not intended to circulate as commercial
paper, and we do not think that the interests of commerce require
that the principles applicable to negotiable paper shall be extended
to a mortgage executed under such circumstances as the mortgage
in question. The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
The general question involved in the
principal ease is so well considered by
Mr. Jones, in his valuable work on mortgages (vol. 1, sect. 834), that we'eannot do better than to use his language.
He says: "An assignee for value of a
negotiable note before due, takes it free
from equities. At common law, so far
as a mortgage is merely a debt, or
security for a debt, it is a chose in
action not negotiable, and, therefore,
not assignable. * * * But the debt
being the principal thing imparts its
character to the mortgage; and although the mortgage itself in the beginning is only assignable in equity, the
legal rights and remedies upon the debt
have become fixed upon this incident of
the debt, and the equitable principles in
regard to the mortgage have become
naturalized in the common-law system.
When, therefore, the debt secured is in
the form of a negotiable note, a legal
transfer of this carries with it the mortgage security; and inasmuch as a negotiable promissory note, by the commercial
law, when assigned for value before
maturity, passes to the assignee free
from all equitable defences to which it
was subject in the hands of the payee,
it does not lose this character which it
has under the commercial law, when it
is secured by a mortgage. The mort-

gage rather is regarded as following the
note, an;t as taking the same character;
and it is the" generally received doctrine
that the assignee of a mortgage securing
a negotiable note, taking it in good faith
before maturity, takes it free from any
equities existing between the original
parties :" Beals v. Neddo, (U. S. C. C.
Kans. 1880), 2 Fed. Rep. 41; Carpenter v. Lozgan, "16 Wall. 271; Kennicott v. Supervisors, Id. 452 ; Sawyer v.
Pr'chett, 19 Id. 166; Hayden v.D rury,
(U. S. C. C. Ill. 1880)i 3 Fed. Rep.
782 ; Paige v. Chapman, 58 N.H. 333 ;
Taylor v. .age, 6 Allen 86 ; Sprague v.
Graham, 29 Me. 160; Pierce v. Baunce,
47 Id. 507 ; Gould v. Marsh, 4 Thomp.
&C. 128; s. c.1 Hun 566; Duttonv.
Ives, 5 Mich. 515; Cicotte v. Gagnier,2 Id. 381 ; Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Id.
395; Reeve. v. Seully, Walk. Ch. 248;
Jones v. Smith, 22 Mich. 360; Helmer
v. Krolik, 36 Id. 371 ; Croft v. Bunster,
9 Wis. 510; Cornell v. licins, 11 Id.
353; Fisher v. Otis, 3 Chand. (Wis.)
83; Martineau v. McCollum, 4 Id. 153;
Kelley v. Wfiitney, 45 Wis. 110; Burhansv. Hutcheson, 25 Kans. 625; Webb
v. Haselton, 4 Neb. 308; reston v.
Case, 42 Iowa 549 ; Updegraft v. Edwards, 45 Id. 513; Farmers' Nat.
Bank v. M-etcher, 44 Id. 252; Duncan
v. Louisville, 13 Bush 378; Bilgery v.
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Ferguson, 3 La. Ann. 84; Logan
v. Smith, 62 Alo. 455 ; Gubbert v.
Schwartz, 69 Ind. 450.
In Carpenter v. Lot'qan, 16 Wall.
271, which was an appeal from the Supreme Court of Colorado, the question
was ably considered, and a conclusion
arrived at in harmony with the prevailing opinion, as above stated. In
rendering the opinion of the court, Mr.
Justice SwAYxE, after stating, among
other things, the doctrine that this was a
case in which equity must follow the
law, said: "A different doctrine would
involve strange anomalies.
The assignee might file his bill and the court
dismiss it. He could then sue at law,
recover judgment, and sell the mortgaged premises under the execution. It
s not pretended that equity would interpose against him. So, if the aid of
equity were properly invoked to givb
effect to a lien of the judgment upon the
same premises for the full amount, it
could not be refused. Surely such an
excrescence ought not to be permitted to
disfigure any system of enlightened jurisprudence. It is the policy of the law
to avoid circuity of action, and parties
ought not to be driven from one forum to
obtain a remedy which cannot be denied
in another."
"The mortgaged premises are pledged
as security for the debt. In proportion
as a remedy is denied, the contract is
violated and the rights of the assignee
are set at nought. In other words, the
mortgage ceases to be security for a part
or the whole of the debt, its express provisions to the contrary notwithstanding.
The note and mortgage are inseparable ;
the former as essential, the latter as
incident. An assignment of the note
carries the mortgage with it, while the
assignment of the latter alone is a nullity:" Jackson v. Blodgett, 5 Cow.
205 ; Jackson v. Willard, 4 Johns. 43.
* * * "The transfer of the note carries
with it the security, without any formal
assignment, delivery, or even mention

of the latter. If not assignable at law,
it is clearly so in equity. When the
amount due on the note is ascertained in
the foreclosure proceeding, equity recognises it as conclusive, and decrees
accordingly. Whether the title of the
assignee is legal or equitable is immaterial. The result follows irrespective
of that question. The process is only a
mode of enforcing a lien. All the authorities agree that the debt is the
principal thing, and the mortgage an
accessory. Equity puts the principal
and accessory upon a footing of equality,
and gives to the assignee of the evidence
of the debt the same rights in regard to
both. There is no departure from any
principal of law or equity in reaching
this conclusion. There is no analogy
between this case and one where a chose
in action, standing alone, is sought to
be enforced. The fallacy which lies in
ovtrlooking this distinction, has misled
many able minds, and is the source of
all the confusion that exists.. The mortgage can have no separate existence.
When the note is paid the mortgage
expires. It cannot survive for a moment the debt which the note represents.
This dependent and incidental relation
is the controlling consideration, and
takes the case out of the rule applied to
choses in action, where no such relation
of dependence exists. Accessorium non
ducit, sequitur principale."
The subject has been regulated by
statute in New Jersey, by which it is
enacted, that in a suit by an assignee
of a mortgage, all just set-offs and
other defences shall be allowed against
him which would have been allowed if
the action had been brought by his
assignor: Rev. 1877, p. 708, sect. 31.
In New York and Pennsylvania, by
almost universal practice, bonds are
used in connection with mortgages in.
stead of promissory notes; and in
those states the rule supported by the
weight of authority, as above stated,
does not prevail. See Jones on Mort.
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regarded as merely voidable by reason
(3d ed.), sect. 834, note and cases
of duress, the question is more difficult;
cited.
and the authorities, so far as they have
In a few states it has been held, concome to our notice, do not appear to be
trary to the general doctrine, that,
The
although the mortgage note is nego- conclusive upon the question.
tiable, the mortgage itself is only as- general rule is, that duress does not
signable in equity, and, therefore, the render a contract absolutely void, but
only voidable. In Worcester v. Eaton,
assignee having to resort to equity to
13 Mass. 376, it was held that a deed
enforce his rights, is compelled to do
equity towards the mortgagor, and for the conveyance of land, acknowlallow him all the rights of defence he edged and recorded, but obtained by
had against the mortgagee; that the duress, might be avoided by the entry
of the grantor or his heirs within the
mortgage follows the notes only in
period of entry, notwithstanding the land
equity, and is subject, in the bands of
the assignee, to any defence which had bqen sold by the original grantee to
a bona fide purchaser. In such a case
would avail against it in the hands of
the maxim caveat emptor was said to
the mortgagor himself, notwithstanding
the assignee may have purchased the apply, as in the case of a grant from an
infant. 'In Bdote v. Henderson, 5 Cald.
note in good faith, for a valuable consideration and before maturity: I Jones 471, the same principle was applied to a.
on Mort. (3d ed.), sect. 838; Johnson contract of sale of a chattel obtained by
dhress. See, however, contra, Deputy
v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 176 ; Hostetter v.
v. Stapleford, 19 Cal. 302; Cook v.
V.
Boligny
Id.
559;
Alexander, 22
Forties, 17 La. Ann. 121; Olds v. Cum- Moore, 39 Texas 255, where it was held
that a deed, though obtained by fraud
mings, 31 Il. 188 ; Fortierv. Darst, Id.
and duress, is only voidable, and that a
212 ; Walker v. Dement, 42 Id. 273;
bon-. fide purchasei from the. grantee in
Bryant v. Vix, 83 Id. 11 ; Darst v.
such deed, for a valuable considerition,
Gale, 83 Id. 136 ; Ellis v. Sisson, 96
Id. 105; U. S. Mortgage Co. v. Gross, without notice of the fraud or duress,
93 Id. 483; Chicago, 6-c., Railway Co. can hold the property. In Bisset T.
Bissett, 1 H. & McH. 211, it was held,
v. Loewenthal, Id. 433 ; Baily v. Smith,
14 Ohio St. 396; Corbett v. Woodward, that an acknowledgment of a deed by a
(U. S. C. C. Oregon), 5 Sawyer 403. feme covert, extorted from her by duress,
The question involved in the principal beating and ill usage, but where she was
case appears to be new and not easy privately examined by the magistrate,
of solution. If, under sect. 1990-of the could not be avoided on account of such
duress, on the ground that she might
Code of Iowa, providing that "a conhave been relieved at the time of such
veyance or encumbrance by the owner
is of no validity, unless the husband and acknowledgment, had she so chosen.
The contrary, however, was held in
wife, if the owner is married, concur in
Worcester v. Eaton, supra, and as it
and sign the same joint instrument,"
would seem properly. See, also, to he
the mortgage in question is regarded as
same point, Central Bank v. Copeland,
absolutely void, the question is relieved
As to what evidenda is
18 Md. 319.
from difficulty; for, if void, the defence
necessary to overcome the certificate of
may be made as against any person.
In this connection the cases of Edgell acknowledgment, see Russell v. Baptist
Theological Sew., 73 Ill. 337 ; N. W.
v. Hagens, 53 Iowa 223; Van Sickles
Ans. Co. v. Nelson, 13 Otto 544.
v. Town, 53 Id. 259, and Spafford v.
Neither the above cases nor those cited
Warren, 47 Id. 47, may be read with
by the court in the principal case, are,
profit. If, however, the mortgage is

